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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
carried out in cases of absolute annuities, 7 even though at times it would
be unreasonable to do so. 18
In annuity cases of this type the courts have usually dismissed the
problem by citing the American authority " and granting the annuitant the
right of election. 1his case, however, although not attacking the right of
election in a direct manner, circumvents it by placing it within the estab-
lished exception 0 and thus weakens its effectiveness. In so doing, the
court evidences the current trend of carrying out the testator's intent, when
it can be determined, in cases where annuitants seek the right of an elec-
tion, contrary to that intent, under the English rule.
TRUSTS - JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS -
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
Upon the death of one of two co-trustees, an action was brought for
judicial settlement of accounts. The trust company, sole plaintiff and
executor of the deceased trustee's estate, named as defendants only the
beneficiaries of the trust and itself. An executor's claim by the trust com-
pany for trustee's commissions was disallowed. The beneficiaries of the
deceased trustee's estate moved for an order to vacate final judgment. Held,
motion denied. The beneficiaries of a deceased trustee's estate, who are not
beneficiaries of the trust itself, are not indispensable parties to an action
for judicial settlement of accounts. United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v.
Bingham, 92 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1950).
The relationship of a trustee to the cestui que trust is that of a fiduciary.
It is the duty of the trustee to protect the trust not only from the claims
of third parties, but also as to the claims of co-trustees.' Similarly, an ex-
ecutor is held to the same high level of conduct in the discharge of his
duties. Executors have a duty to assert all claims in favor of the estate.2
However, there is nothing in the office or obligations of executors that
precludes them from acting as trustees upon other trusts and for other bene-
ficiaries, if the transaction is not inconsistent with the duties which they
owe as trustee.8 However, beyond any intrinsic conflict of duties, there are
procedural safeguards accorded to the beneficiaries of the different estates
when one, in one capacity, sues or joins himself in another capacity.
17. Feiler v. Klein, supra note 11; Bedell v. Colby, supra note 11; In re Johnson's
Estate, sura note 11.
18. Berry v. Bank of Manhattan Co., supra note 4.
19. Parker v. Cobe, supra note 2; In re Cole's Estate, supra note 5.
20. See note 16 supra.
1. Earle v. Earle, 93 N.Y. 104 (1883); see In re Bun's Estate, 143 Misc. 877, 879,
257 N.Y. Supp. 654, 656 (Sun. Ct. 1932); c. Matter of Cozzen's Estate, 2 Con. 622,
15 N.Y. Supp. 771 (Surf. Ct. 1891); RESTATEMENT, TRaSTS §§ 178, 184 (1935).
2. In re Kohler, 231 N.Y. 353, 132 N.E. 114 (1921).
3. Barry v. Lambert, 98 N.Y. 300 (1885).
CASES NOTED
The rule of law that a'person cannot be both plaintiff and defendant
in the same action is well established.4 That rule applies in all cases in
which the character of the plaintiff and defendant unite in the same person 5
although such person may not be the sole plaintiff and defendant or may
sue and defend in different capacities.' However, the rule is a technical
one s and where it precludes maintenance of an action at law, equity, in
order to furnish a remedy, has afforded opportunity for one to be both
plaintiff and defendant in one action. 9 This is not infrequent in accounting
actions, but, in order to protect necessary or interested parties, an essential
element of the procedure has been the requirement that they be made
parties to the action.10 If the requirement should not be met, a decree
could not preclude such necessary or interested persons from asserting their
rights or interests." Statutes have extended this procedure to a point where
these parties need only be served with notice when the person is accounting
to himself.'2
The majority of the court, in the instant case, based its decision on the
ground that an executor might sue on behalf of the estate without joining
with him, as parties plaintiff, the beneficiaries of the estate.' 3 If the court
had based its decision on this ground alone, it would seem that it had
avoided completely the troublesome aspect of the case, i.e., the question
of adversary proceedings. However, it is apparent that much reliance was
placed on a statute which provides that where a fiduciary is accounting to
himself in another capacity, all interested persons must be served with
notice.14 The rationale advanced was that inasmuch as the trustee bad ac-
counted to the beneficiaries of the trust estate and not to himself, it was
not mandatory that he, as executor of the deceased trustee's estate, serve
notice on interested persons of the latter estate. Allowing the statute to
govern gives rise to the question: Did the court, by a nicety of distinction,
4. See Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Hines, 273 Fed. 774, 777 (2d Cir. 1921);
Swope v. Swope, 173 Ala. 157, 55 So. 418 (1911).
5. Buckeye Refining Co. v. Kelly, 163 Cal. 8, 124 Pac. 536 (1912); Brown v. Mann,
71 Cal. 192, 12 Pac. 51 (1886).
6. Faulkner v. Faulkner, 73 Mo. 327 (1880); Medlin v. Simpson, 144 N.C. 397,
57 S.E. 24 (1907).
7. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Hines, sura note 4.
8. Alexander v. Mare, 5 F.2d 964 (lst Cir. 1925) (the rule is not enforced even
at law where the parties and interests are not actually the same); State v. Bonzer, 68 N.D.
311, 279 N.W. 769 (1938).
9. See Pratt v. Boody, 55 N.J. Eq. 175, 35 Atl. 1113 (Ch. 1896); In re Haigh's
Estate, 125 Misc. 365, 366, 211 N.Y. Supp. 521, 522 (Sun. Ct. 1925).
10. In re Haigh's Estate, supra note 9. See 4 BOCERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 969(1948.11. Green v. Green, 182 Md. 571, 35 A.2d 238 (1943); In re Buck's Estate, 267
App. Div. 320, 45 N.Y.S.2d 665 (2d Dep't 1943).
12. N.Y. SURROCATE'S COURT ACT § 262; Matter of Massimino's Estate, 143 Misc.
119, 256 N.Y. Supp. 32 (Surr. Ct. 1932) (where the requirement was not met).
13. N.Y. Civ. PRuse. ACT § 210.
14. N.Y. SURROGATE'S COURT ACT § 262 (10) ("where an accounting executor,
adm'r, guardian or testamentary trustee accounts to himself in a separate capacity ...
it shall not be sufficient to cite or obtain the appearance of the accounting party ...
only ...there shall be cited all persons interested...").
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unnecessarily limit Fisher v. Banta"' which has heretofore been a restraining
factor on one acting in a dual capacity when he is before the court?
The court in the instant case stated that Fisher v. Banta is different in
fact and principle since in that case service on the protesting parties was
required on the ground that the administrator attempted to account to him-
self as executor. The dissent, in a vigorous opinion, stated that cognizance
of factual and procedural differences between the instant case and Fisher v.
Banta "leaves undisturbed the true inwardness of Fisher v. Banta."'8 It
went on to emphasize that the real substance of Fisher v. Banta is that one
acting in a dual capacity cannot preclude either set of beneficiaries by a
judgment in a suit in which they are not parties.
It seems that on principle the dissent is more persuasive. It is a funda-
mental rule that a party cannot maintain an action against himself,17 or
hold the position of plaintiff and defendant in proceedings in which he can
dominate the controversy.18 Fisher v. Banta seems to fall squarely within
this principle, the fact of accounting notwithstanding. Under this view of
Fisher v. Banta there is authority within the jurisdiction for vacation of the
judgment. This precludes the necessity of finding an interest in the ac-
counting proceedings, by the beneficiaries of the deceased trustee's estate,
in order to collaterally attack the judgment.' 9
The instant case is not one of co-trustees jointly seeking commissions
on the one side and the beneficiaries of the trust on the other. Here the
Trust Company as trustee, was under a duty to oppose the claims for com-
missions20 and, as executor, under a duty to assert the claim of the deceased
trustee's estate.2 ' Though the Trust Company retained independent coun-
sel, nevertheless, it was in a position of divided loyalty. Since a decree ap-
proving a trustee's account is conclusive evidence as to matters contained
therein,22 a subsequent suit by the beneficiaries against the executor bring-
ing into question his accounts as the trustee would be practically a denial
of relief. It is submitted, therefore, that the judgment should have been
vacated and the beneficiaries of the deceased trustee's estate made parties
to the suit in order to insure a vigorous assertion of the claim.
15. Fisher v. Hubbell, 65 Barb. 74 (N.Y. 1873), aff'd sub norna, Fisher v, Banta, 66
N.Y. 468 (1876) (Executor of the A estate, who was also administrator of the B estate,
filed his final accounting as administrator and gave notice to himself as executor but none
to any of the distributees of the A estate. Subsequent to final decree discharging him
as administrator, the beneficiaries of the A estate sued to have both wills construed. The
court held that the prior decree discharging the administrator did not preclude, from
bringing suit, the beneficiaries of the A estate who had not been served in the prior suit).
16. United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Bingham, 92 N.E.2d 39, 43 (N.Y. 1950)
(In the Fisher case the parties who stood to gain ignored the previons litigation and
started a plenary action while in the principal case they ask to be made parties).
17. See note 4 supra.
18. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943).
19. In re Busto's Will, 173 Misc. 25, 19 N.Y.S.2d 4( Surr. Ct. 1939). See 4
BOCERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 973 (1938).
20. See note 1 supra.
21. See note 2 supra.
22. N.Y. SURROCATE'S COURT AcT § 274.
